# Korea in the New World Order

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Abstract:

Working paper developed from a lecture presented in Seoul about the role of Korea in the New World Order. Summarizes the historical background of the concept of a New World Order and its evolution after the Gulf War of 1990-91. Describes the fundamental issue behind the New World Order as whether the global diffusion of technological capacity in the late 20th century (and the associated spread of the capability to produce weapons of mass destruction) must lead to chaos, or can be organized in a stable peace. Asserts the important role of regional as well as global institutions in building a New World Order, citing historical successes and failures in Europe, the Middle East, the Americas, and the Pacific Basin. Discusses the importance of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the key role of the Republic of Korea in expanding and strengthening APEC in order to create peace and economic development throughout the Pacific Basin.

Keywords: New World Order; Korea; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); Pacific Basin

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# KOREA IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

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# Korea in the New World Order*

## I

## Introduction

On May 3, 1965, I had the privilege of talking at Seoul National University. My assigned subject was, in substance: Where did the Republic of Korea stand in terms of the stages of economic growth? I argued that Korea was at the beginning of take-off. It is a rough measure of the extraordinary achievement of the men and women of this country that, a quarter century later, I have been asked to talk in Seoul on "Korea in The New World Order." This time I shall argue that a Korea that has sustained since 1965 an average annual growth rate of about 7% per capita; that is on the eve of the age of high mass consumption, while rapidly approaching the technological frontier; and which is actively engaged in increased democratization of its political life -- such a Korea, has a role of consequence and responsibility to play if, in the generations ahead, the global community is to bring to life a New World Order.

My argument proceeds in four steps.

First, I shall try to identify the powerful underlying forces which brought the concept of a New World Order to the surface in the second half of the 1980s, well before the Gulf War. This concept played some part, for example, in the remarkable symposium organized by the Seoul Olympic Sports Promotion Foundation in September 1989.

Second, I shall explore how the Gulf War both heightened our awareness of the need for a New World Order and sharpened our understanding of the extremely difficult problems that must be solved if the concept is to be given substance.

My third point is the peculiarly important role of regional as well as global institutions in building a New World Order.

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*In addition to the important contribution to this paper by Thomas Seung, noted in the text, I wish to thank Harry Middleton for helpful suggestions, and Elspeth Davies Rostow for rigorous editing for both detail and substance..

And, finally, I shall suggest a potential role of Korea in such a grand enterprise.

II

Underlying Forces.

It was the apparently sudden end to the Cold War that posed the questions: What next? Within what broad framework should we view the world and set our objectives? The notion of a New World Order arose from efforts to answer those questions. The key to an answer lies in a curious fact: the forces which led the Soviet leadership to bring the Cold War to an end and to contemplate radical changes in the Soviet system, are precisely the forces which the world community must confront and organize peacefully if a New World Order is to be achieved.

First -- and above all -- was the progressive diffusion of power and technological capacity away from both Moscow and Washington. This was, of course, not a new phenomenon. I would date it from 1948 when Tito successfully broke with Stalin and when the American Congress voted the Marshall plan legislation guaranteeing that in time a vital Western Europe would re-emerge.

It was also in the late 1940s that Moscow's attention shifted to the expansion of Soviet power and influence in the developing world. In sustained pursuit of that goal, Moscow enjoyed some tactical gains; but disappointments mounted with the split with China and frustration with increasingly assertive nationalism in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. This long campaign was climaxed by the debacle in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Meanwhile, it became apparent that Eastern Europe would become increasingly difficult and expensive for Moscow to control. And so Gorbachev cut the imperial knot, as British Prime Minister Clement Atlee had done forty years earlier by granting Indian independence .

The diffusion of technological capacity also had the effect of spreading the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass destruction into the

developing regions, turning them into sources of anxiety for Moscow rather than areas of opportunity.

Soviet anxiety was further heightened by the character of the great technological revolution which came on stage in the mid-1970s: micro-electronics, genetic engineering, lasers, and a batch of new industrial materials. The pace and diversified character of that revolution proved impossible for a centralized command economy to manage; and so the Soviet Union found itself falling behind Western Europe, Japan, the United States, and, even, behind such a precocious developing country as The Republic of Korea. Among the consequences of the new technologies was a globalization of communications and of the world economy itself, which dramatized to much of the Soviet leadership that, unless revolutionary changes were brought about, the U.S.S.R. would become a self-isolated, technological backwater, caught in a time warp.

It was precisely this diffusion of power, combined with a new technological revolution, which posed the central challenge for a New World Order: Would the forces of diffusion which rendered the Cold War obsolete lead to chaos? Or could this arena of multiple centers of competence and initiative, caught up in accelerating global interactions, organize itself in stable peace?

That is what the New World Order is about. But, as a goal and a dream, the New World Order is not new. It was memorably defined forty- six years ago. Listen, for a moment, to the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, a piece of prose worth recalling from time to time.

> **"We the peoples of the United Nations determined**
>
> to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
>
> to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

**and for these ends**

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

**have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims."**

As definitions go, I doubt we can do much better than that.

But there is a deeply-rooted problem built into the Charter. The preamble is proclaimed by the "peoples of the United Nations;" but the document was signed by representatives of governments which carefully preserved their sovereignty. Thus, the United Nations was not designed as a world government but, in its own phrasing, as "...a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of ... common ends."

## III

## Two Lessons of the Gulf War.

Against this general background I would underline two of the many possible lessons to be drawn from the Gulf war. First, the war dramatized both the potentiality and the limitations of the United Nations as the foundation for a New World Order. Second, as the post-war agenda in the Middle East emerges, the critical role of regionalism in a New World Order becomes increasingly clear.

The Gulf War will surely be remembered as the first occasion when all the five permanent members of the Security Council did the following three things: one, took a

clear, firm stance against an act of aggression; two, explicitly sanctioned the use of force to undo that aggression; and three, negotiated agreed terms for a cease-fire in the wake of military success. In this city I need not recall that forty years ago the Security Council, in the absence of the Soviet Union, also sanctioned the use of force to undo an act of aggression. On both these occasions the existence of the United Nations as a meaningful organization was at stake. If it had not acted in 1950 and 1990 it would have gone the way of the League of Nations when that body failed to act in response to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931. In June 1950, of course, the Soviet Union did not participate in the United Nations decision. Nevertheless, the United Nations has twice proved that it is capable of "uniting its strength" to resist aggression. But, as the tragedy of the Kurds in Northern Iraq and of the Shiites in the South attest, the Charter can reaffirm its "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person;" but it provides no effective machinery to enforce such rights when violated within the boundaries of a sovereign government. Very strong forces would now oppose any effort to grant such enforcement power to the United Nations. The Economist put it bluntly in its issue of April 16th:

> Both the Americans and, much more painfully, the Kurds have run up against the same truth: it is that in the late 20th century the rules of the international game set great store by sovereignty. Superpowers or coalitions may intervene against a tyrant to stop him spreading his nastiness abroad, but not to stop him inflicting nastiness upon his own people. So runs the uneasy present convention. It was upon this understanding that the allies supported the operation against Iraq.

The first painful lesson dramatized by the Gulf war is that the cause of human rights within a sovereign nation can not be enforced by the United Nations. That cause must be advanced by other means -- a proposition to which I shall return.

A second lesson of the Gulf War is that while aggression can be resisted and undone by effective military action in a fairly short time, the creation and maintenance of "peace and security" is a long slow job in which political, economic, and military measures must combine.

In the case of the Middle East there is a rough consensus that regional peace and security require three conditions:

-- A settlement of the Palestine, Lebanon, and other major unresolved political questions within the area.

-- A reliable arms limitation and control agreement that would rule out the temptation for any Middle East nation to seek regional hegemony by military means.

-- A regional development bank to accelerate the economic and social progress of the less affluent, financed, in part, at least, by oil revenues provided by the nations richly endowed with oil reserves.

Although these three requirements are an interrelated package, there is a sequence built into them: arms control agreements require prior political settlements; an appropriate mobilization of regional and external resources for economic and social development requires a radical reduction of military expenditures which, on latest estimates, absorb 9% of the region's gross product.

Obviously, none of this is possible unless the governments and peoples of the Middle East – looking back over more than forty years of bloody struggle; looking at the tragedy all around them, looking at their children and heeding their fate -- decide that enough is enough; that it is time to make peace. Surely, the self-inflicted tragedies of the region since the end of the Second World War justify that decision. Those outside the region can try to help. But only the men and women who live in the Middle East can decide. But if these history-haunted human beings decide for peace and security, all three components of a settlement are quite possible.

## IV

## The European Example

We know that some such outcome is possible because Europe, for many centuries an arena of carnage, has managed to create over the past forty-six years a reasonable if still somewhat fragile approximation of the international "peace and security" for which the

United Nations Charter calls. It did so by acting effectively, in collaboration with the United States and, in recent years, with the Soviet Union, in all three of the dimensions cited earlier as necessary for a Middle East settlement:

-- solutions to critical political questions; notably Germany and Eastern Europe;

-- arms control measures ruling out the possibility of military hegemony; and

-- assistance from the more advantaged to the less advantaged nations of the region: notably, to countries in Southern and Eastern Europe.

The key to this historically remarkable outcome lay in two characteristics of the process: first, the development of a relatively high degree of unity in post-war Western Europe; and the recognition by Western, and, later, Eastern Europe that both the United States and the Soviet Union had legitimate, abiding interests in the outcome.

Why was Western European unity so important? There were, of course, significant economic advantages that came to Western Europe from post-war cooperation and then the Common Market; and there are further economic advantages to come if the goals of 1992 are achieved and if, over the next generation, the economies of Western Europe and a revived Eastern Europe are woven together But the importance of this process and, indeed, its initial motivation was much deeper. The immediate post-war architects of Western European unity were trying to answer three profound politico-military questions: How to create a safe, equitable, and civilized long run relationship between Germany and the rest of Europe; how to balance and deter the potential hegemonic power of the USSR; how to create the basis for dignified partnership with, rather than disproportionate dependence on, the United States.

Despite some dangerous European crises over the past two generations these questions have been answered reasonably well as of the present; although the balance achieved will evidently have to be watched and nurtured, not taken for granted, over the generations ahead.

In terms of a New World Order, the point to be underlined is that, in a world of national sovereignties, regional cooperation can provide the only route to peace and security we know -- short of a single government; namely, a stable balance of power. I would add that, it took a remarkable balance of power deal between the big and small states to manufacture the federal union of the United States in 1787; that is, the compromise that resulted in two senators from each state, irrespective of size.

The curious character of the American Senate illustrates the final point I would make about regional organizations in general: they are the natural protectors of small and medium versus large, potentially hegemonic states. It was natural, for example, that, in post-war Europe, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Italy were the most reliable friends of European unity, except, of course, for the time when Jean Monnet quietly guided French policy.

V

Some Reflections on Regionalism Elsewhere

I have argued thus far an essentially simple pair of propositions;

-- The United Nations has now twice proved it can mobilize the will and force to undo an act of overt aggression albeit at severe human and material cost;

-- but "to maintain international peace and security" and avoid military conflict the Security Council must be supplemented by regional organizations and agreements that, in effect, render acts of aggression grossly irrational by creating and sustaining regional balances of power. In that connection I cited the progress of Europe in the second half of the twentieth century and the agenda that confronts us in the Middle East.

While each region, like each nation, is unique, the case for regionalism may be generalized.

I will now cite briefly two further regional cases: the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific Basin.

One rarely sees public reference to the Organization of American States (the OAS). In part that is because it is not doing all that it might be doing -- or, at least, all that I would like to see it do, notably on the side of economic and social policy. But in part the OAS is somewhat somnolent because it fulfills fairly well -- not perfectly, but fairly well -- its three security functions.

The first is a function which quietly commands virtually universal agreement in the Western Hemisphere; namely, that no extra-continental power should emplace itself militarily in the region. Perhaps Khruschev's greatest surprise when he sent nuclear weapons and warheads to Cuba in 1962 was the overwhelming support in Latin America for President Kennedy's insistence that these weapons be withdrawn -- much greater support than that provided by Europe and Asia..

Second, the OAS is an instrument for limiting United States intervention in Latin America. The 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic was an interesting case. Support for intervention to avoid a Communist coup was, in fact, much stronger than a number of Latin American governments indicated in public; but, without question, there was widespread Latin American uneasiness in principle, against U.S. unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic. What happened? The OAS organized a Hemispheric military force under a tough Brazilian general to take over from the United States command; and it organized a carefully inspected democratic election to choose a new government. To almost everyone's satisfaction -- and, I must add, widespread surprise -- the Dominican Republic has enjoyed reasonably steady economic and social progress under democratic government for the past quarter century.

I would not for one moment argue that American actions in the Western Hemisphere have always commanded universal support in Latin America. Perhaps the saying attributed to Porfirio Diaz overdoes it: "Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States." But the colossus of the North has on occasion been an awkward neighbor, as well as, from time to time, a good neighbor. Nevertheless, I do believe the OAS would be

regarded in Latin America as a useful instrument to balance the historic disproportion between the economic and military power of the United States and the nations of Latin America, a disproportion diminishing with the passage of time and the diffusion of power.

There is a third security task for the OAS; to deal with conflicts between Latin American states -- specifically, the considerable anxiety arising from time to time among the smaller states with respect to the three largest Latin American states.

The foreign minister of one of these smaller states once put it very well in a private conversation: "The only legitimate function of our military is, in case of invasion, to make a dignified show of force on our frontier until the OAS observers arrive." In an imperfect world that is an impressive tribute to the civilizing role of the OAS. Even more impressive is the fact that Latin American states spend only about 1% of GNP on their military establishments, by far the lowest regional average in the world.

I shall not on this occasion examine the potential regional agendas of Africa and South Asia. They involve similar but obviously not identical security, economic, and social tasks.

VI

The Organization of the Pacific Basin

I turn now to an enterprise much closer to Seoul: the regional organization of the Pacific Basin. On November 9, 1989, twelve nations meeting in Canberra set in motion an organization for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). November 9, 1989, was also the day the Berlin Wall came down It is possible that only two people on the face of the earth independently expressed in public the view that in the long sweep of history the modest birth of APEC may well outrank the end of the Berlin Wall: one of those men was my old friend Lee Hahn-Been writing in Korea Business World, the other was myself, in a television interview on November 9th.

I took that view because for some time it was quite clear that Stalin's empire in Eastern Europe was doomed; that soon or late the wall would go; and all behind it would

change. On the other hand, APEC was a collective, first formal step on one of the most important tasks of the twenty-first century: to assure that the governments and peoples of the Pacific Basin "maintain international peace and security ... practice tolerance and live together ... as good neighbors."

In terms of population, economic and technological momentum, and military potential the Pacific Basin is likely to remain the most important single community on earth. It contains not only China and Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States, but is also inevitably linked by geography with South Asia. And in the course of the coming century that linkage could become increasingly important, especially if South Asia's affairs could be stabilized in the spirit of the organization of South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC), created in 1983.

Put more bluntly, the challenge to the Pacific Basin in the coming century is not to repeat the tragedy of the twentieth century. That tragedy can be defined in this way: on four occasions, nations which arrived somewhat late to command over all the then existing technologies, looked about; observed that those who developed earlier were distracted by economic problems, isolationist in spirit, or otherwise weakened and disorganized; and decided that regional hegemony was within their grasp. Thus, the Kaiser, the Japanese military, Hitler, and Stalin plunged the world into two global conflicts and a cold war kept reasonably chill -- but not for Koreans -- mainly because of mutual fear of the consequences of using nuclear weapons. All four aggressive efforts failed; but the tragedy of these struggles and their aftermath dominated the twentieth century and are only now beginning to lift.

I would underline that the early developers, including the United States, bear some responsibility for the outcome. Their behavior before these conflicts helped encourage the belief that aggression might succeed. In this world of diffuse and still diffusing power with the capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction proliferating, we must all strive never to let it happen again.

This is a good time, then, to move forward in building and giving substance to APEC which will have its third meeting in Seoul in November. It is true that the problem of Cambodia has not yet been settled and Vietnam has not yet found the road to civilized and efficient modernization which its talented people are clearly capable of traveling. The issue of unity is still to be settled peacefully by Koreans; and formal peace established between Japan and the Soviet Union. But over-all the scene is relatively tranquil and the time propitious to move forward on the many tasks of economic and technological cooperation which ought to be on our common agenda.

I had the privilege of observing the growth of the spirit and habit of European unity from the earliest post-1945 days. That sense of unity grew by doing things together day after day -- in coal and steel, transport and electric power, trade and finance. An authentic sense of community gradually emerged so strong that the young men and women of Western Europe now hardly know when they cross a national frontier. A sense of the Pacific Community is not that far advanced; but we should remember that the idea of the Pacific Basin did not begin with the Canberra Communique of 1989. That communique was, in fact, one result of innumerable regional conferences and experiments in cooperation -- by the private as well as the public sector -- over the two previous generations. APEC has deeper roots than one might think.

What about the network of security relations in the Pacific Basin? Do the new circumstances require significant change? Certainly there are no grounds for combining the present network in some kind of Pacific NATO. The security concerns of the various countries of the region vary a good deal; and the present network of arrangements by and large meets those concerns. If they do not, that fact will emerge in time. But if I have any advice to the governments it would be this: let them be. These arrangements have seen us through some four difficult decades to better times. The current arrangements threaten no one; and there is no general threat. This is a time for concentrating our energies on building the constructive dimensions of the Pacific Community, not destabilizing its security

foundations, just as in Europe it is time for East and West to concentrate on the rehabilitation of the Eastern economies, and other constructive enterprises, not on the disintegration of NATO.

Let me say a word about my country. A few years ago there was a good deal of talk in the United States and around the world about the decline and fall of the United States as a great power. Lately there has been a good deal of talk about the United States as the single remaining super-power. Both images of the United States are, I believe, misleading. My country has had and still has a considerable array of serious domestic problems; but we are a big, resilient, creative society, with many centers of initiative and experiment and a saving, skeptical sense of humor. We are committed by our origins as a nation to ideals beyond our reach -- perhaps beyond human reach. But we keep striving. On our most serious problem -- the building of a multi-racial society of equal opportunity -- I have been able to observe great progress in my lifetime, but obviously we have a great deal more to do. I believe the increasingly multi-racial character of American society will be a source of American strength in the next century. In short, I believe the United States will prove a viable nation in the coming generations.

As for being a super-power, I have argued for at least the past thirty years that power was being systematically diffused away from both Washington and Moscow and that the notion of a super-power is an illusion; and progressively becoming more of an illusion. The United States does represent a significant margin of power and influence when it does the right thing. If the United States seeks to do something which runs against the grain of majority thought and feeling in the world, it can be easily frustrated or, indeed, vetoed. When its view of things conforms to the common view or majority interest, the United States can still play a useful catalytic role in the enterprise, as in the recent Gulf crisis.

In the Pacific Basin, the United States is simply one of many players. APEC is a club where each of us will have to listen carefully to each other, and understand how the region looks from each capital, to get things done.

VII

Korea and the New World Order

Suppose the picture I have drawn of a strengthened post-Cold War United Nations supplemented by sturdy regional organizations is a reasonable approximation of a New World Order -- a bringing to reality of part, at least, of the dream enunciated in the preamble to the United Nations Charter. Where does Korea fit into this scheme of things?

This is a much harder question to answer than to estimate Korea's stage of growth 26 years ago. Obviously, only Koreans can decide. As one privileged to observe closely and to share a little of Korea's evolution over the past thirty years, I offer, therefore, only a few tentative observations.

In the living room of our home in Austin, Texas, is a gift from an official of this country. It is a splendid model of one of Admiral Yi Sun Sin's turtle ships which preserved Korean independence in the Battle of Chinhae Bay in 1592. It symbolizes a good deal of Korea's history and achievement: to have stubbornly preserved its independence -- cultural, political, and economic -- surrounded as it has been by much larger and more powerful neighbors. And it is not yet a world where that spiky toughness, ingenuity, and determination to be independent can be safely abandoned.

But if I am broadly correct this is an historical interval when large positive objectives should be sought, and there is a decent hope that we can make progress towards them.

For the Republic of Korea, of course, first is the achievement by peaceful means of a unified country. There are, evidently serious problems to be solved but they are strictly a matter for agreement among Koreans.

A second task is building on the foundation of APEC, and all that lies behind it, a solid, active, constructive, and inclusive Asian and Pacific Community. Here the experience symbolized by Admiral Yi's turtle ships can be turned to constructive account. Korea sits almost literally at the point of juncture of three of the great Pacific Powers: China, the Soviet Union, and Japan. It has shared almost a half century of hard times and

good times with the United States. As with the people of Western Europe, within the framework of mutual security arrangements, the Korean people have understandably wished to reduce their dependence on the United States. I believe this is one reason the Republic of Korea has worked since the 1960s on behalf of Asian regional cooperation. The American government has supported both objectives: a Korea reducing its dependence on the United States -- or any other nation -- and increasingly engaged in cooperative ventures in the Pacific Basin.

Korea is now and is destined to be a substantial, middle-level power in the Pacific Basin and in the world. If all goes well, we may all end up as middle-level powers; for we are entering an era in which we hope the possession of weapons of mass destruction – and military power itself -- will become decreasingly important. In any case, the Republic of Korea has earned the respect of the world community, even of governments once its enemies.

In the development of the Pacific Basin, Korea is in a unique position to help harmonize the interests of the Community's members and has a profound and abiding stake in that harmonization.

I believe China and the Soviet Union will join APEC and, Taiwan and Hong Kong as well. There are problems to be settled before this enlargement comes about. But the organization can not achieve its full potential until that happens.

As for substance, it is clear that there are more potentially fruitful areas for economic cooperation than APEC can initially undertake. As a development economist I would underline one area highly appropriate in building a sense of community among nations at different stages of development; namely, assistance from the more advanced to the less advanced in building up their capacity to absorb efficiently sophisticated modern technology. This is particularly important in an era where a powerful technological revolution is rapidly unfolding; the less advanced nations are anxious not to be left behind;

and the more advanced are anxious to contribute creatively to the extension of the world's technological frontier.

One characteristic of this particular technological revolution is its close links to areas of basic science which are themselves undergoing revolutionary change. To enlarge the technological absorptive capacity in the Asia-Pacific community and to increase its capacity to enlarge the world's scientific and technological base, APEC might consider creating and financing an Institute of Advanced Scientific Research which would concentrate on enlarging the scientific base on which innovations in micro-electronics, genetic engineering, lasers, and new industrial materials must rest. Such a frontier institute would not only increase the understanding of scientists from the less advanced countries of the region, on which absorptive capacity partly depends, but also enlarge the creative contribution to the world community of the region as a whole.

The United States and other advanced industrial nations have benefitted handsomely in trade and otherwise from their programs of technical and economic assistance since 1945, and I was pleased to learn recently in the pages of Korean Business World of the impressive scale of the Republic of Korea's current progrma of foreign aid.

As for the world beyond the Pacific Basin, the Republic of Korea is already an active player in the world economy; and its role is expanding rapidly as I was reminded when I rolled our luggage out of the Budapest Airport last summer on a carrrier bearing a large SAMSUNG sign. Although it now only has official observer status at the United Nations, if I counted correctly, the Republic of Korea is a member of thirty-seven multilateral bodies including the International Whaling Commission. Its clearly established global status was confirmed and enhanced by its elegant as well as efficent hosting of the 1988 Olympics. Korea's responsibilities evidently transcend the Pacific Basin and are destined to expand.

VIII

Of In and Yeh

When I came to this point in planning my talk I reached a question I couldn't answer: what in Korea's cultural and historical tradition fitted the role of a creative, understanding, humane middle power, helping pull together in reasonable harmony, a vast and diverse community? For that is the way I would describe a role for Korea in the New World Order as a whole.

I put the question to a greatly respected Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas, Korean-born Professor Thomas Seung.

Professor Seung proceeded to educate me in the concepts of In and Yeh. He explained that historically Korea was regarded and regarded itself as the Eastern country of propriety, of courtesy, of civilized behavior. And behind this categorization lay a view of human beings as dependent on, understanding and caring for one another. He regarded this view as an extension of the Confucian view beyond the family to wider communities. He thought it was time for Korea to build its policy at home and abroad increasingly on this strand in its cultural heritage.

Professor Seung's lesson recalled a memorable conversation. The time was an extremely early breakfast on October, 5 1983. The place was a hotel in Seoul. My wife and I were leaving later that morning for Calcutta. My companion at breakfast was the economist Kim Jae-Ik, adviser to the President. I had heard a good deal about him during our days in Seoul. He appeared to be universally respected. I was pleased to accept his invitation to breakfast.

We had much to talk about and got on well. I finally asked him this question: What is your greatest concern about the future of Korea? He paused and then replied: 'The youth. They naturally take the economic progress achieved in the past generation for granted and seek new objectives. But I fear they do not understand that those wider

objectives depend on continues economic progress which can not simply be taken for granted. It must be carefully nurtured even as we widen our horizons.'

As a teacher since 1940, living and working with the young, I reminded him how inevitable it is that each generation strike out in new directions; but I agreed that in a world of rapidly changing technologies an economy can never rest on its oars without paying a high cost in the quality of its life as well as in material affluence.

It was with a heavy heart that I read a few days later in an Indian newspaper on October 10 that Kim Jae-Ik was assassinated in Rangoon.

As an old teacher I am too experienced to prescribe objectives for the young, let alone the young of another country. But I am sure the young of all countries have an instinct to link their lives to some high ideal. And it may be that Professor Seung's effort to educate me in In and Yeh as a guide for policy at home and abroad may be of interest.

In the context of this talk, these Confucian injunctions have a special meaning. You may recall my observation that the United Nations could, under the right circumstances, undo aggression; but it was never meant to have the power to guarantee "fundamental human rights, the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] ..the equal rights of men and women." The governments meeting in San Francisco in 1945 could reaffirm their faith in these precepts; but the task of achieving these goals was left to each national society.

Since then these goals have not been fully achieved anywhere and in some places there has been little or no progress -- or, even, retrogression. But if one looks to the relative strength of democracy versus dictatorship in the world, as a whole, there has been discernible progress in recognizing and acting on these fundamental human rights -- enough progress for all of us to persist in the effort, as indeed Korea has done.

## IX

## A Conclusion

What, then, is the New World Order as conceived in this paper?

Built on the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, it embraces these five elements:

-- A credible framework of 'uniting for peace' by the United Nations Security Council, especially its permanent members, to undo acts of aggression.

-- Against that background, systematic and organized regional efforts, embracing where acceptable a role for interested nations outside the regions, to maintain balances of power that make regional aggression grossly irrational.

-- Systematic regional as well as global economic and technological cooperation including sustained efforts by the more advanced nations to assist the less advanced in moving forward in economic and social progress.

-- Stubborn efforts by governments and their citizens to continue the trend towards increased democratization and the further extension of "human rights," including respect for "the dignity and worth of the human person."

-- The underpinning of this effort to achieve a civilized and humane world order by a heightening within our several societies of those strands in our respective cultures and religions which enjoin the individual to care for the fate of others as well as our own.

It is my judgment that the Republic of Korea, by its efforts, example, and cultural inheritance is in a position to make a major contribution to all these dimensions of a New World Order in the generations ahead.

I am aware that one should speak about the future with considerable caution and diffidence, rembering John Maynard Keynes' dictum: "The inevitable never happens: it is the unexpected always." Nevertheless, when I spoke of Korea's economic future with hope in May 1965, I did so with a high degree of confidence. I feel today a similar degree

of confidence in the possibility of a New World Order and of Korea's important role within it. .

I conclude with a few lines of poetry to which I have often returned. They come from the nineteenth century American poet, Walt Whitman, after whom I happen to be named. Only in preparing this talk did I learn how close they are to the spirit of In and Yeh:

"One thought ever at the fore --
That in the divine ship, the world,
Breasting time and space,
All peoples of the globe together sail,
Sail the same voyage,
Are bound to the same destination."

W. W. Rostow
Austin, Texas
April , 1991